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I first read Roy Bhaskar in Radical Philosophy in 1980, when ‘Scientific Explanation 
and Human Emancipation’ appeared.2 But when Bhaskar’s work cropped up in Art & 
Language’s writing in the early 1980s I resolved to read his A Realist Theory of 
Science (1975) and The Possibility of Naturalism (1979).3 I remember buying both 
from the excellent philosophy section of the old Compendium Books store in 
Camden Town. Art & Language were (probably) the first artists and art-theorists to 
recognise the critical importance of Bhaskar’s writing for a non-reductive account of 
realism in relation to art and cultural theory, given their general familiarity with 
debates in the philosophy of science and Anglo-American philosophy of language. 
W.V.O. Quine and Nelson Goodman, for instance, were part of the group’s daily 
conversational practices as artists during this period.4 Indeed, given their familiarity 
with the issues of intention, intension, the causal theory of representation (of-
relations) the critique of empiricism and their general grounding in analytic 
philosophy and Boolean formal logic, the group were certainly well placed to 
develop Bhaskar’s own ground-breaking critique of empiricism in the philosophy of 
science, and push it in a productive cultural direction. Bhaskar became a crucial 
mediating figure between the ‘post-metaphysical’ interrogative mechanics of the 
analytic tradition and the genealogical-materialist commitments of Marxism, a link at 
the time that was then a growing influence in English Marxism, which eventually 
mutated a few years later, unfortunately, into the less than compelling analytical 
Marxism.5 
 
As was widely acknowledged during this period Bhaskar’s concept of realism as an 
emergent category (of powers, relations and tendencies), became an underlabourer 
for a growing reassessment of Marx as a realist thinker, certainly the Marx of Capital, 
where methodologically issues of stratification, negation and constellationality were 
crucial. This is why politically, as much as philosophically, Bhaskar was part of a loose 
group of philosophers and political theorists in the UK in the 1970s who were 
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addressing questions on Marx, realism and methodology, such as David-Hillel Ruben, 
Derek Sayer, Sean Sayers, Tim Benton, Kate Soper, Andrew Collier, Christopher 
Norris, Chris Arthur, Simon Clarke, and Alex Callinicos. In what ways is Marx’s realism 
‘productivist’ as opposed to ‘reflectionist’? In what ways is Marx’s dialectic 
specifically realist?6 This range of work was particularly incisive at the time, given the 
rapid retreat in the academy and public debates from a non-positivistic Marx under 
the growing shift of post-Althusserianism into post-Marxism and the postmodern 
onslaught. Most of this early reception of Bhaskar and Marx-as-realist, was done 
either consciously or indirectly in response to this newly muscular reactionary 
context.  
 
Certainly in my own writing, Bhaskar created a pathway to think about realism in art, 
as opposed to realism as art;7 and as such, a way of cutting through the conflation of 
realism with resemblance and its association with the conventional painterly realism 
that still dominated both official art history and the emerging social history of art. 
For what Bhaskar’s stratified account of realism allowed in relation to cultural 
questions was a discussion of realism and truth separate from the empirical, dis-
aligning the real in classical scientific terms, so to speak, from realism, and therefore 
divorcing politics in art from any simplistic adherence to the aesthetics of realism; 
indeed, realism, in these terms, might have little to do with what is commonly 
understood as ‘representation’ or picture-making at all. This move, of course, did not 
stand-alone culturally, insofar as in an important sense the notion of realism-as-
method was backed up by excellent avant-garde credentials. Roman Jakobson, for 
example, had published an important assessment of the ‘relativism’ of realism as a 
category in art and literature in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, long before the 
state sanctification of ‘socialist realism’, but little of this debate and the legacy of the 
Society for the Study of Poetic Language (OPAYAZ), was available in the West until 
the mid-to-late 1970s.8 Similarly, in the mid-to-late 1970s, the key German debates 
from the 1930s (Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, and 
György Lukács) were translated, allowing a renewed insight into Jakobson’s 
understanding of realism as a contested category.9  
 
There was a fruitful period of exchange, therefore, between the newly emergent 
philosophical realism and this legacy of the avant-garde, following further English 
translations of the Russian Marxist-Formalist writers from the 1920s, and Brecht’s 
‘counter-realist’ theory. In addition, in 1980 Terry Lovell published her influential 
Pictures of Reality: Aesthetics, Politics and Pleasure, which used Bhaskar to generate 
a model of realism in cultural theory and film aesthetics, that relied on (some of) 
these avant-garde precedents. If realism was to be understood as an emergent 
category, then, in art and film it couldn’t be held to derive from fixed genres, stable 
naturalistic relations, and narrative continuity; on the contrary, social appearances – 
in the spirit of montage – needed to be de-naturalised, re-narrativised and re-
signified through a process of conceptual abstraction. But if Lovell uses Bhaskar and 
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the recently translated avant-garde theory to depose conventional accounts of 
realism, she made an additional move against what might be construed as being the 
dominant philosophical-avant-garde paradigm of the time: Althusserian anti-
humanism and theoretical conventionalism. In a direct sense Pictures of Reality was 
a ‘clearing out’ of the post-Althusserian post-realist consensus from seventies 
Screen-influenced film theory, in which a concept of constructedness in film and art 
is confined to the highly attenuated notion of the ‘open text’ – the film/artefact that 
reflects on its own means of production and signification.10 In contrast to this version 
of anti-naturalism, Lovell called for a ‘post-coventionalist’ constructed realism that 
was partly indebted to Brecht – although critical of what she saw as Brecht’s residual 
rationalist ‘cognitive realism’ – but also to Raymond Williams’s notion of a 
‘subjunctive’ realism, a realism not in the ‘indicative sense of recording 
contemporary reality, but in the [prospective] sense of proposing a possible 
sequence of actions beyond it.’11 In these terms, Lovell’s and Williams’s respective 
identification of realism with the construction of the popular (later to become crucial 
to British Marxist cultural studies, albeit without the allegiance to realism) marks out 
the production of the spectator/political subject as an enabling agent of collective 
political transformation. Lovell’s intention, on this score, was clear: ‘It is impossible 
to produce a truly revolutionary text in a discourse in which only the dominant have 
any facility.’12  
 
But in some sense this popular and prospective realism was stillborn, as the political 
conditions for such a cultural politics in and outside film culture shifted with the rise 
of the new right, diminution of the political force of the industrial working class, and 
crisis of class identity and politics as a result of a massive shift in the composition of 
the social base of the industrial working class globally. Indeed, who was actually to 
participate in, and sustain this realism as a popular counter-hegemonic project, 
when much of labour movement was moving in the opposite direction, and labour 
culture as a site of stable industrial-based identities (certainly after the 1984 miner’s 
strike) was in decline? Also, Lovell’s (and Williams’s) too easy dismissal of the avant-
garde as elitist compounded the problem in its re-routing of the question of realism 
back into anti-formalism in an unconscious re-run of the debates on film in the 
Soviet Union, after the populist attacks on Sergei Eisenstein’s October as ‘incoherent’ 
at the 1928 Party conference on film. Lovell’s notion of the popular text has clear 
echoes of Anatoly Lunarcharsky’s defence of Vsevolod Pudvokin’s ‘popular-
narrational revolutionary cinema’ (The End of St.Petersburg) as a proto-Hollywood 
counter to the Russian-Futurist legacy.13 
 
Nevertheless, the importation of a broadly anti-positivist realism into cultural theory 
and film theory during this period (indebted to both Bhaskar’s critical realism and 
the new counter-realist milieu) created a renewed expectation that a rearticulated 
realism might offer a new politics in art that avoided the pitfalls of conventional 
realist aesthetics – it is just that the defence of a post-Brechtian and Williamsian 
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‘popular text’ wasn’t able carry this forward without both bathos and pathos. This is 
because realism, or realism-as-philosophical method rather than realism-as-
aesthetics, needed to reconnect with modernism and the avant-garde in all their 
complexity if it was to secure an openness for itself in these severely reduced 
circumstances. Realism and the avant-garde needed to be conjoined; not pushed 
apart. Indeed, by 1983 the debate on realism had once more come to seem utterly 
provincial – certainly in the visual arts – in an unfortunate reprise of debates from 
the 1930s, in which ‘good faith’ and earnestness in the form of the revival of realist 
painting was pitched against what was left of a righteous post-Althusserian politics 
of deconstruction that overly identified art (photography) and film with ‘ideology 
critique’. As Terry Eagleton was to say in his review of Aesthetics and Politics in New 
Left Review in 1978, in some sense pre-empting the terminal crisis of the Anglo-
Althusserian avant-garde:  
 
It is temptingly easy to caricature the aesthetics to which a case leads – to 
fantasize that films which draw your attention to the camera thereby impel 
you out inexorably onto the picket lines. But if that is indeed a caricature, it 
can hardly be said that some aspects of this case’s conception of realism are 
anything less. For realism, in so far as it aims at the fixing of naturalized 
representation whose traces of production have been repressed, is by that 
token intrinsically reactionary…In a comical inversion of the aesthetics of 
Lukács, realism is now the ontological enemy.14  
 
This is why the publication of Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory in English in 198415 
was extraordinarily important for me and a number of other writers of my 
generation, who were committed avant-gardists, yet wanted nothing to do with 
post-Althusserianism and post-structuralism, and who, in turn, had no truck with 
conventional realism, yet remained philosophically committed to some conception 
of realism out of Marx that might be useful for an ‘open-ended’ and transformative 
understanding of cultural practice and artistic subjectivity. Admittedly, this was 
certainly a difficult juggling act, and there was nothing initially to suggest culturally 
that something like a conjunction of Adorno and Bhaskar’s realism might bear fruit. 
But what Aesthetic Theory foregrounded above all else, in contrast to what might 
have been picked up more generally from the collection Aesthetics and Politics, was 
the notion that the asymmetry between the real and realism, realism-as-method and 
realism-as-aesthetics, might provide a politics of negation for art, in which the 
critique of artistic form – not just the ‘critique of representation’ – was productive 
and enabling. Moreover, Adorno’s own philosophical ‘realism’ – his attack on 
voluntarism and leftist cultural piety – provided a better critical armature for a 
politics of the Thatcherite and Reaganite conjuncture than did a renewed cultural 
studies attached to ‘identity politics’ and a sanguine populism, whether identifiable 
with postmodernism or not. That is, crucially, Adorno’s ‘aesthetic theory’ did not fall 
for the notion that all art had to do in order to produce a critically transformative 
spectator was to ‘politicize’ itself and enter ‘living social relations’. On the contrary, 
                                                 
14 Eagleton 1978, 24  
15 Adorno 1984. 
 5 
the politicization of art could just as easily be compatible with humanist sentiment 
and with the whole self-deluding machinery of substitutionist and actionist fantasies.  
Hence what Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory opened up, for this writer at least, was a 
politics of culture that retained the singular force and presence of modernist 
negation – of distanciation and disaffirmation – but within a cultural-political 
framework that took no comfort or solace from modernist forms of aestheticism and 
‘anti-representation’. But this was an Adorno not instantly recognisable from 
Aesthetic Theory and from the received assumptions about Adorno as a critic of 
mass culture and jazz; one therefore had to perform a symptomatic reading to get 
the best out of Adorno’s text; or rather – more affectingly – in order to stay with the 
spirit of the book one had to steer it away from the clichéd notion that it was the 
theoretical summit of a gloomy modernist elitism – still the received view of Adorno 
on the left in the mid-1980s. On the contrary, Aesthetic Theory is riven with 
interesting caesuras, glitches, aporias, and hiatuses in its account of the modern in 
art, that derive from Adorno’s (necessarily) unresolved negative dialectical account 
of art’s autonomy and heteronomy under monopoly capitalism. Although there is 
little systematic attention given to the visual arts and visual culture in the book, 
nevertheless, at various points, Adorno is highly sensitive to the ease with which an 
aestheticized concept of autonomy in modern art (of formal abstraction, non-
representation, ‘non-communication’) is able to accommodate itself to the market 
and academic administration, irredeemably weakening any presumed link between 
aesthetic transcendentalism and resistance. This means that for Adorno there is no 
essence of modernism to defend as a redoubt against mass cultural heteronomy, 
and certainly not against conventional realism. Indeed, if Adorno defends 
modernism in Aesthetic Theory at all, it is a modernism shot through with a 
disaffected and self-negating drive to escape art itself, a position inherited from the 
avant-garde critique of the art institution. And, two of the most interesting moments 
of this self-negation (amongst many), are his brief use of the figure of the philistine 
as a counter-cultural spectre of bourgeois aestheticism and transcendentalism, and 
his equally significant notion that, after Hegel and Romanticism, after conceptual art, 
and the crisis of modernist aestheticism, art has a working non-identitary 
relationship to ideation in art, that necessarily puts its canonic visual and sensible 
forms under jeopardy. As he says, firstly, vis-à-vis ideation: ‘the widely accepted 
notion – a bowdlerized theorem of aesthetics ... [is] that art per se ought to be 
visual. It ought not. Art belongs squarely in the conceptual realm’;16 and, secondly, 
vis-à-vis the philistine:  
 
Artlessness or philistinism is the antithesis par excellence of aesthetic 
behaviour. While it frequently shades into the vulgar it is different from 
vulgarity, representing indifference to or hatred of art where vulgarity is 
more like an uncouth smacking noise. Politically the ban on artlessness is as 
culpable as the emphasis on nobility, for it rates mental labour higher than 
physical labour…Art needs this ideological aspect if it is able to correct itself 
perpetually.17 
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Although, these, two notions, are mere isolated moments in Aesthetic Theory, 
combined with Adorno’s general critique of aestheticism, they provide vivid 
instances of Adorno’s model of negation in relation to the exigencies of artistic form 
and the division of intellectual labour and artistic subjectivity. Indeed, they go to the 
very heart of art’s intimate and conflicted place in the relations between autonomy 
and heteronomy, insofar as they stage autonomy in art as a social relation. In other 
words autonomy is produced out of art’s heteronomous conditions of possibility; it is 
not an inherited (modernist) style or set of specific aesthetic moves.  
 
As such, the suggestiveness of this was a spur for Dave Beech and myself in the mid-
1990s to attempt to do justice to Adorno’s insights and to a workable theory of 
negation in art in our systematic encounter and theorization of the philistine as the 
would-be via negativa of the aesthetic. That is, despite its spectral presence in 
Aesthetic Theory, the philistine promised all kinds of critical opportunities for a 
theory of negation that could move the philosophical debate on realism and politics 
in art forward, in a political and cultural context, where the revival of ‘aesthetics’ had 
again frozen the complexities of the autonomy/heteronomy relation, and realism 
itself. In this sense the debate on the philistine was, in short, a new version of an old 
cultural debate – the debate on class, art and emancipation that goes all the way 
back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s critique of art as bourgeois amour propre,18 and to 
Kant and Hegel’s dialectical negation of this critique in the interests of art’s universal 
emancipatory spirit – that Marx (and Adorno) inherited.  
 
This is why Bhaskar’s own shift to an explicit model of dialectical negation – 
following his own ‘Marxian/Leninist/Adornian’ encounter with Hegel, so to speak – 
was so crucial to our thinking at the time, for it allowed us to think the philistine 
relationally across the autonomy/heteronomy divide. For, contrary to some of our 
critics, at no point did we ever see the cultural figure of the philistine as a solution to 
cultural division, or as an emancipatory herald of proletarian revolution; rather, what 
made the philistine an interesting figure in relation to both the production and 
reception of art, was precisely its immanent, negating character. The philistine  
 
is not a non-specific other, but holds a non-transferable position in cultural 
relations. And, in this way, it is related hierarchically to other non-
transferable positions such as the aesthete and connoisseur. This is because 
the philistine is the outcome of the complex positions produced by the 
internal relations of cultural division.19 
 
 Consequently in our reading of Bhaskar’s Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (1993), we 
saw an opportunity to draw out the immanent negative character of the philistine on 
a systematic basis, through an adaptation of Bhaskar’s account of negation as real 
determinate absence. That is, following Bhaskar argument, the character of the 
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philistine as the ‘uncultured’ or ‘culturally excluded’, is not a positive identity, 
amenable to ‘politicization’ but, on the contrary, a shifting identity that consistently 
haunts the relations of bourgeois culture as the repressed or barely acknowledged 
determinate absence immanent to cultural division. It cannot, therefore, fulfil a 
transparently emancipatory role at all, because the emancipatory content it 
possesses is marked by its structural exclusions; that is, the ‘uncultured’ cannot 
magically become the ‘otherly-cultured’. In our two essays for New Left Review, 
(1996-8), then, the philistine as real determinate absence becomes a way of 
reintroducing a realist asymmetry into the debate on art and politics and 
emancipation – and not, as was occasionally assumed by our critics, an anti-aesthetic 
stand-in for the Bakhtinian carnivalesque or anti-Kantian voluptuous body. That is, 
the philistine functions as the self-negating haunting of the aesthetic, rather than its 
antipode. Thus, we might say, in Bhaskar’s terms, that although the philistine has no 
positive identity as a negation of trained aesthetic judgement and critical cultural 
competence, given its shifting position internal to the relations of cultural division, 
its absenting of bourgeois cultural power is a condition of bourgeois culture’s 
intelligibility as a class formation; that is, the philistine’s non-deferential absenting of 
such competences exposes such competences to class scrutiny. This is why Bhaskar 
was keen to talk in Dialectic about absence as real absence.20  
 
Something of this ambiguity about the function of the philistine and what our notion 
of the philistine was actually doing – was it an anti-aesthetic or ‘hedonistic’ inversion 
of the bourgeois aesthete or a figural ‘haunting’ of bourgeois culture? – was 
reflected in Gary MacLennan’s response to our writing in Journal of Critical Realism 
in 1998.21 If MacLennan is supportive of what the philistine promises as real 
determinate absence in relation to exposing the class function of culture, he is less 
persuaded by what this actually means in terms of ‘philistine modes of attention’ 
and philistine forms of agency on the ground. And he would be right. There is little 
critical leverage or self-transformative agency to be won from the supine pleasures 
of mass culture, or from rejecting ‘high culture’ per se. But, the philistine was never 
designed to elevate such fallen pleasures, despite our initial indulgence in a kind of 
rebarbative proletarianization of the pleasures of the popular, which might be 
described as the Proletkult phase of our theory of the philistine. Rather, more 
broadly and more convincingly, the philistine was a way of thinking class subjection 
in culture without opting for the two usual ‘improving’ solutions to its usual 
rebarbativeness: firstly, the outright rejection of the philistine as a manifestation of 
false consciousness, and as such, the advocacy of the transformative power of ‘good 
works’ (as in the edifying edicts of the humanism, left or right); or, secondly – the 
cultural studies option – the assimilation of the philistine into an affirmative account 
of popular pleasures and pastimes as forming micro-communities of resistance, in 
which hairstyles have equal billing with avant-garde films. Neither option is 
successful in resolving the problem of the philistine, precisely because each 
positivizes what it assumes to be its failings or strengths, missing the way in which, 
as a real determinate absence, the philistine can never be equal to any negative or 
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positive identity attributed to it. As such what our non-identitary definition was 
designed to accomplish, then, was something altogether more affecting and 
purposeful: the return of ‘political reason’ to those ostensibly outside of culture who 
resist the overtures of bourgeois culture. Humanist and aestheticist correctives and 
cultural studies subaltern advocacy fail to do this given their respective 
diminishment of the philistine as a self-reasoning and autonomous concept-user, 
albeit one whose range of options and transformative possibilities are severely 
constrained by this assumed autonomy. But this is precisely the point: to defend the 
philistine is to defend the reason of non-compliance, not an acceptance of the 
‘reason’ of the idiot savant or ignorant. In other words, in recognizing the fractured 
and torn subjectivity of the philistine as that which ontologically cannot be 
assimilated to the humanism of aesthetic discourse, aesthetic discourse’s claims to 
universal inclusion are rendered frangible.  
 
Why embark on such a critical trajectory though? What is to be gained in defending 
this negative space within aesthetic discourse, this relation of non-relation? Well, in 
the 1980s and 1990s, quite a lot, when the debate on culture and art was overrun by 
postmodernism and post-Marxism and claims to realism-as-method – certainly in art 
– were considered, as such, outré and almost redundant. To offer up the philistine, 
therefore, as an anti-positivistic disclaimer of the current aesthetic and pluralist 
settlement – was deliberately provocative, particularly given its earlier twilight life in 
Adorno, who was then, in the US and Europe, undergoing an extraordinary 
‘aestheticist’ reinvention as part of the new Weberian critical theory and post-
structuralist reception of Adorno-as-troubled-aesthete. The New Aestheticists who 
entered the debate, found this invitation to the philistine the most uncomfortable of 
all: ‘this was not the Adorno we signed up to in our fight against postmodernism.’ To 
use the philistine, against postmodernism, against post-Marxism, against 
conventional realism, and against (and with) Adorno was undoubtedly touched by a 
kind of Marxist hubris. But this is why Bhaskar was so crucial to this move: for the 
realism at stake in the debate on art and culture was negatively ‘expressive’ (in the 
Hegelian sense) rather than ‘reflectionist’ (in the Kantian sense); that is, whatever 
self-conscious philistine modes of attention might be employed by artists and 
writers, the discussion was subject overall to the ontological condition of the 
philistine as a real determinate absence and, therefore, to the wider need for the 
absenting of this absence as a primary condition of universal emancipation. The 
discussion on the philistine was determined in the last instance, consequently, not 
by its contribution to the postmodern/modernist debate on low culture and high 
culture, or even the modern and the everyday, but on fundamental questions of 
autonomy, subjectivity and freedom. Indeed, the core philosophical concerns of the 
discussion were essentially those of power and self-determination: who, and what 
speaks, when the philistine speaks, or fails to speak? What interests does the 
aesthete speak to, when the philistine speaks? And, consequently, what happens to 
the interests of both philistine and aesthete as a result?  
 
What is properly realist about this intervention, then, certainly for myself, was it that 
was a first move in a return to the debate on art and culture, to the relations 
between negation, the subject and the capitalist totality: something, that Bhaskar 
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and Adorno share. And this is why the absenting figure of the philistine was a way of 
exposing the increasingly harmonious and assimilationist criteria of both 
postmodernism and the ‘return to aesthetics’, in either its modernist or 
conventionalist realist guises. For it provided a rent, or disaffirmative gap, through 
which the fictiveness of the totality of cultural relations might be exposed. This was 
borne out in practical terms by the double crisis of the return to aesthetics and 
postmodernism in the mid-to-late 1990s in the widespread ‘turn to the social’ in art 
globally, as finance capital begins to destroy its own liberal cultural base, through the 
marketization of all values, realising a huge amount of dissensual and critical energy 
that could not be contained by the old formal allegiances of the art market and art 
institution. Thus postmodernism may have won the hegemonic battle in the 1980s 
and 1990s when popular culture looked the more progressive bet for art against a 
deracinated high culture; but, as financial capital began to weaken the social 
interests of ‘capital in general’ and destroy the living conditions of most artists and 
state support, at the same time rendering art even more subordinate to commerce 
and the spectacle, it was unable to secure the assent of a sizeable new generation of 
artists and intellectuals. Emerging from this period of increasing constraint, 
indifferent to both market and institution, these artists began to relink the socially 
transformative capacities of art to a totalizing critique of capitalism. Relational and 
post-relational aesthetics, tactical media, participatory art, and the new forms of 
communal practice constitutive of the new network culture, were all central to this, 
as was the move, more generally, to an intellectual gift economy. The point was not 
that this work represented an extensive left turn in art, or had radicalized a new 
generation, but that technically and subjectively it opened up art to modes of doing 
and being not subject to the dolours of object production for exchange, and in this it 
made loose alliance with various ‘uncultured’ friends of the philistine: the amateur, 
the non-professional artist, the ‘non-artist artist’, the technician and activist. And 
Bhaskar, at least, for myself, in the mid-1990s, was important philosophically in 
grasping the avant-garde dynamic of this, insofar as Dialectic provided a language of 
negation without ‘endism’ and closed totalities. In the spirit of this anti-historicism, 
in 1998 Dave Beech interviewed the artist Keith Tyson, the future Turner Prize 
Winner (2002): 
 
DB: Roy Bhaskar, the British philosopher, has argued that our thinking about 
reality has to begin with 'non-identity' and end with 'open unfinished 
totality'. Most philosophical mistakes, he says, 'derive from taking an 
insufficiently non-anthropocentric, differentiated, stratified, dynamic, holistic 
or practical view of things’. Don't a lot of ideas about art make these 
mistakes? I mean, the idea that art is expressive, or art is visual, or art is 
whatever an artist says it is, or art is a commodity – aren't these daft 
simplifications of art? And if they are, don't we have to think about making 
art in ways that take account of this complexity? 
 
KT: I haven't read him yet. But that sounds like a pretty accurate description 
of what I was trying to do with the Artmachine. Which was to de-
anthropocentrise the notion of how art is. And also to make something that 
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embraced complexity instead of trying to simplify it. I just cannot believe that 
any one descriptive or philosophical or political model is complete.22 
 
Yet, if this clearly instances what dialectical critical realism might provide for an anti-
historicist, socially stratified and intra-relational account of contemporary art and 
cultural production, Bhaskar himself, unfortunately showed little interest in 
exploring these connections. Disappointingly, the cultural ramifications of dialectical 
critical realism, by the late 1990s, were swallowed up by Bhaskar’s move to a 
spiritualized non-dualist ‘creativity’, which as a model of emancipation lost all 
traction with the vicissitudes of class subjectivity and the symbolic, the 
conjuncturally specific and praxiological agency. The overriding feeling was a kind of 
retreat to a Rousseauian account of art as amour propre; creativity was not reducible 
to the professional discourse of art and cultural production, and therefore lay more 
broadly outside of the cognitive and discursive altogether. Of course, there is no 
reason why Bhaskar should use dialectical critical realism to reflect on the artistic 
legacy of realism, modernism and the avant-garde; there was never any indication 
that he saw this as part of his philosophical project. Yet the valorization of a non-
discursive creativity seemed like an anti-modernist attack on the modern 
philosopher as an advocate for the emancipatory (non-identitary) role of art, and on 
the Hegelian view of the development of art as an increase in reflexive 
consciousness and, as such, perilously close to pushing the cultural debate into 
creativity-as-self-enchantment and autopoietic intuitivism. ‘Thinking can never get 
us to action. At some point we just have to stop thinking (about), and just do; and 
that is spontaneous, intuitive.’23  I say perilously close, because Bhaskar does 
admittedly say elsewhere that creativity is not ‘ontologically non-immanent.’24 
Nevertheless, this vacillation inflates human sentience (consciousness) at the 
expense of human sapience (concept formation).25 And, crucially, as regards the 
political outcomes of (underused) human sapience this is not what I see was at stake 
in the notion of real determinate absence in cultural theory: namely bringing 
creativity into productive and egalitarian alignment with concept-use as part of the 
‘general intellect’, in Marx’s sense. Under the strictures of Bhaskar’s metaReality, 
creativity becomes merely the underdetermined realm of sentient ‘all inclusiveness’. 
In other words, to what extent is Bhaskar’s critique of discursiveness liberatory? 
 
These criticisms are certainly worth exploring another time, as part of a larger 
debate about creativity and emancipation, art and concept-use. But here it suffices 
to ask: where is dialectical critical realism best used and situated in cultural theory 
today? 26  What useful dialectical philosophical materials might continue to be 
employed from Dialectic, as a means of sustaining the transformative and 
emancipatory link between negation in cultural theory and art and sapience? As 
                                                 
22 Beech 1998, 18. 
23 Bhaskar [2002] 2012, 145. I’m sure Bhaskar had no cultural memory of this, but the quote 
sounds like a conservative homily from a 1960s modernist painting tutor, intent on releasing 
the ‘inner creativity’ of his students.  
24 Bhaskar [2002] 2012, 134 
25 For a defence of the Hegelian legacy of human sapience, see Brandom 2000. 
26 See e.g. Verstegen 2013.  
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such: in what ways is realism-as-method and the legacy of realism as representation 
(of the avant-garde and realism) mutually engaged?27 Indeed, Dialectic has barely 
been broached as a theoretical resource on cultural questions; and yet its vividness 
and productive complexity was what made it such an extraordinary intervention into 
the ‘complacencies of the age’ in the early 1990s. In its range and ambition it 
singularly demolished the de-totalizing, de-stratifying and anthropocentric 
tendencies of the postmodern and retro-positivistic ascendancy. In this sense I owe 
it a great deal. 
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